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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHER1IAN V. LUND, 
Plaintiff-Appella.nt, 
-vs.-





BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for alleged property damage aris-
ing out of a break of respondent's gas pipeline near 
appellant's home. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon the close of the appellant's evidence, defend-
ant moved for dismissal on the grounds that appellant 
had failed to sustain the burden of proof. The trial court 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's 
order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the facts as stated by appellant, 
but wishes to point out that the gas line in question was 
located in 7100 South Street, a public street in Bountiful, 
Utah ( T 5). The gas line was laid at a depth of 39 inches 
in that street (T 8), and the respondent immediately 
came to the area upon notice of the break ( T 52). Also, 
appellant raises the issue of the pre-trial order, for the 
first time,. upon this appeal. 
ARGU1\1ENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY SUB~IISSION 
OF THE CASE TO THE JURY UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
On August 22, 1962, a pre-trial conference was held 
in this matter, and on September 20, 1962, the appellant's 
counsel submitted a pre-trial order which stated, among 
other things, that respondent had exclusive management 
and control over the gas lines in question (R 5). On the 
following day, the respondent submitted an objection to 
the pre-trial order. On September 28, 1962, the pre-trial 
order was signed by the court without notice or hearing 
upon respondent's objection and denial of exclusive man-
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agement and control. Appellant now claims to have relied 
upon this provision of the pre-trial order although appel-
lant's counsel was no doubt aware of the trial court's 
inability to make such a substantive finding in a pre-
trial order absent stipulation or admission. Action of 
appellant's counsel at the trial further belies such 
reliance, as he attempted, unsuccessfully, to prove the 
exclusive control requisite to invoking the aid of the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. Appellant's counsel endeavored 
to show exclusive management and control by calling as 
his own witness a Mr. Makin, an employee of respondent, 
and questioning him at considerable length on the matter 
(T 4-11). The trial judge recognized this failure of proof 
and without the aid of the doctrine, appellant's case 
failed. 
In effect, the pre-trial order as it related to exclusive 
management and control, was improperly signed to begin 
with, was ignored by appellant's counsel at the trial and 
was thus amended at trial. Failure to formally amend 
the pre-trial order is not error under such circumstances 
and particularly where the court admits evidence to the 
same extent as if the order had been so formally amended 
(3 "Jioore 's Federal Practice 1132) and such informal 
amendment is necessary to prevent manifest injustice 
(Jlaryland Casualty Co. v. Rickenbaker, CCA 4, 1944, 
146 Fed. 2d 751). In this case, appellant tried but simply 
failed to prove that a pipeline laid at a depth of 39 inches 
in a public street and accessible not only to the general 
public but also to owners and constructers of other under-
ground pipelines and structures, was in the exclusive con-
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trol of respondent. Had appellant really relied upon the 
defective pre-trial order, such an endeavor of proof of 
exclusive control and management would have been 
totally unnecessary. 
In the case of Musolino Le Conte Co. v. Boston Con-
sol. Gas Co. (:~fass. 1953) 112 XE2d 250, the plaintiff 
sued for damage resulting from gas escaping on the 
plaintiff's premises. The plaintiff proved that the gas 
came from a broken or cracked valve in defendant's main 
line which was located in the street immediately outside 
of the plaintiff's premises. The plaintiff relied on the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, alleged ownership, and con-
trol of the main by the defendant. The Supreme Judicial 
Court of lVJ.:assachusetts in sustaining the defendant's 
directed verdict stated: 
''The law of this Commonwealth does not go so 
far as to allow an i11f0rence of negligence in a 
case such as this. '"' '" * There have been a number 
of cases against gas companies founded upon 
negligence in allo\ving the escape of gas from 
street mains, but in all of them, as we understand 
the reports, there was eYidence of negligence in 
addition to the mer~ fact of the break and escape 
of gas, and all of them were treated as cases in-
volving the question of negligence upon all the 
evidence without attaching peculiar significance 
to the mere facts of a break and a leak.'' 
The court further stated: 
''The company has control of its pipes only in a 
limited sense. They are buried often under thick 
pavement, in miles of streets of which the com-
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pany does not have control. They cannot be con-
tinuously dug up for inspection.'' 
In commenting on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
this court in the case of JJ atie0itclz v. Hercules Powder 
Company, 3 Utah 2d 283, 282 P.2d 1044, held that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply in explosion 
cases unless the thing that exploded was in the exclusive 
control of the defendant. Also, this court has held the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not apply merely be-
cause the gas itself is under the exclusive management 
and control of the gas company; otherwise, the doctrine 
could be made to apply against the supplier of gas in any 
case of injury resulting therefrom regardless of the 
amount of control or the kind of care exercised over them 
by others. (TiVightman v. Jfoun.tain Fuel Supply Com-
pany, 5 Utah 2d 373,302 P.2d 471). 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was specifica1ly 
made an issue of law in the pre-trial order. Such an issue 
is to be determined by the court and was found not to be 
applicable as a pipeline laid in a public street is not sub-
ject to the exclusive control of the O'wner. 
P01xrr II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIR-
CRETION IN REFUSI~G TO ALLO\V THE 
APPELLAXT TO REOPEN HIS CASE. 
Appellant in his brief states that the case was based 
solely upon the negligence or lack of negligence of the 
respondent in causing or allowing the gas to leak from 
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its main (T 10). We agree with this statement. To 
establish negligence on the part of the respondent, the 
appellant had the burden of proving that the break in the 
line was due to the respondent's lack of proper degree of 
care to prevent the escape of gas or to remedy the defect 
after notice thereof. The appellant's evidence and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom does not 
show a lack of due care on the part of the respondent nor 
does it show failure to remedy any defect after receiving 
notice. For these reasons the court granted the respon-
dent's motion to dismiss at the close of the appellant's 
evidence ( T 86). After the motion had been granted, the 
appellant moved to reopen for the purpose of adducing 
additional testimony on the question of negligence. In 
support of his motion to reopen, the appellant made an 
offer of proof (T 90-91). In this offer the appellant 
stated that he was prepared to show that while the main 
line was within the boundaries of a public street, it was 
not within the traveled portion of the street; that part of 
the cover over the line was removed (not stating how or 
by whom), leaving the line 16 inches below the surface; 
that there were no inspections since the line was laid in 
1947, and that the line was under the dominion of the 
respondent. The appellant did not state why he did not 
present this evidence in his case in chief, nor did he com-
plain that his failure to so do might have been because 
of his now claimed reliance upon the pre-trial order. This 
offered evidence was cumulative and no valid reason be-
ing offered for not presenting it earlier, the trial court 
denied the motion to reopen ( T 91). This was certainly 
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within the discretion of the court and proper under the 
circumstances. 
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P. 2d 
983, this court in commenting on the trial court's refusal 
of permission to reopen stated : 
''The refusal of the trial court to grant a motion 
of the plaintiffs to reopen to present additional 
evidence, after he had rendered his decision, was 
well within his discretion.'' 
We submit that the same is true in this case in which 
the appellant moved to reopen after the court had 
granted respondent's motion to dismiss, and did not 
raise the issue of the pre-trial order as an excuse or 
reason for reopening. 
The trial court's order of dismissal should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John Crawford, Jr. 
Kastler & Crawford 
180 East 1st South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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